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Abstract
Social Networks (SNs) are now widely used by modern time internet
users to share any personal information. Such networks are so rich in
information content that there is public and commercial benefit in
sharing them with other third parties. However, information stored in
SNs are mostly person specific and subject to privacy concerns. One
way to address the privacy issues is to give the control of the data to
the users enabling them to suppress data that they choose not to share
with third parties.
Unfortunately, above mentioned preference-based suppression tech-
niques are not suﬃcient to protect privacy mainly because they do not
allow users to control data about other users they are linked with.
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Information about neighbors becomes an inference channel in an SN
when there is known correlation between the existence of a link be-
tween two users and the users having the same sensitive information.
In this thesis, we propose a probabilistic inference attack on a sup-
pressed social network data, that can successfully predict a suppressed
label by looking at neighboring users’ data. The attack algorithm is
designed for a realistic adversary that knows, from background or ex-
ternal sources, the correlations between labels and links in the SN.
We experimentally show that it is possible to recover majority of the
suppressed labels of users even in a highly suppressed SN.
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Özet
Sosyal Ağlar günümüz internet kullanıcıları tarafından kişisel bilgilerin
paylaşımı amacıyla yaygın olarak kullanılmaktadır. Bu tür ağların, bilgi
içerikleri çok zengin olduğundan, diğer üçüncü partiler ile paylaşımı kamusal
ve ticari fayda getirmektedir. Ancak, sosyal ağlarda saklanan bilgiler çoğun-
lukla kişiye özeldir ve gizlilik endişelerine tabidir. Gizlilik sorunlarını gider-
menin bir yolu, kullanıcılara kendi verilerinin kontrolü vermek ve istedikleri
verileri bastırarak üçüncü kişilerden gizlemelerini sağlamaktır.
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Ne yazık ki yukarıda bahsedilen tercihe dayalı bastırma teknikleri gi-
zliliği sağlamaya yetmemektedir. Bunun temel sebebi, bu tür koruma sis-
temlerinin kullanıcılarına, bağlantılı oldukları diğer kullanıcıların paylaştık-
ları veriler üzerinde kontrol izni vermemeleridir. Aralarında bağlantı bulu-
nan kullanıcılar arasında veri benzerliği açısından ilişki mevcuttur; bu ilişki
de iki komşu kullanıcı arasında veri çıkarsama kanalı oluşturur. Bu tezde
bastırılmış sosyal ağlarda komşu kullanıcıların verilerine bakarak kişilerin
bastırılmış bilgilerini bulabilen olasılıksal bir çıkarsama saldırısı öneriyoruz.
Bu saldırı algoritması sosyal ağdaki etiketler arası bağıntıyı ve bağlantıları
bilen gerçekçi bir düşmana göre tasarlanmıştır. Yüksek derecede bastırılmış
sosyal ağlarda bile kullanıcıların bastırılmış etiketlerinin çoğunluğunu çıkar-
samanın mümkün olduğunu deneysel olarak göstermekteyiz.
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1 Introduction
Social Networks (SNs) [19] are among the most popular communication and
sharing platform on the Internet in the modern world. SNs are vast in size
and can carry personal and sensitive information of an individual such as
political views, religion, sexual orientation, etc. This raises every privacy
concern when SN data is published for research purposes or released to third
parties for business purposes. Without a direct transfer of SN data, even a
simple internet user can easily get access to lots of profiles and information
by just searching for publicly available SN data, i.e. by finding people with
open profiles using web crawlers, elaborated in [38, 14].
Given such a threat, most service providers oﬀer various privacy policies
for their registered users most of which allow users to choose what information
to share and whom to share with. For example, a user can specify her age
to be publicly available while suppressing the political group he/she is a
member of. However, to what extend such policies address privacy concerns
remains to be an open question. The main problem with such preference-
based protection mechanisms is that the users cannot decide what other
people, that they are connected with, are sharing. Additionally, the user
may share some information without the exact knowledge of its consequences.
Or, just connected people may share information about the user also without
considering the aftermath [23, 8, 17].
As we know SNs are not just a way to keep records, like hospital databases
or voter lists. In SNs people mimic their daily social life onto the internet
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public. As in real life, people do make mistakes and can cause an informa-
tion breach for someone else. Such as publicly asking someone about his/her
private disease. There is also another way to breach privacy in SNs, which
is caused by emotions. People act, just like in real life, on some emotions
like anger, sadness, grudge, etc. Hence they are more willing to share private
information about other purely based on the emotions they have against
them. For example if two best friends start to hate each other, they may
post information publicly against each other. But beyond these two fac-
tors sometimes the user itself discloses his/her information with the help of
his/her neighbours. This is because people tend to build relations with sim-
ilar backgrounds or facts, like school, age, political views, religious views,
sexual orientation, etc. A person may hide his/her information, but the
network he/she creates around him/her-self is a way to define him/her.
Such information disclosed by ’neighbours’ serves as an inference channel
for any suppressed data if the adversary knows that some correlation exists
between the existence of a link among two users and the users having the
same sensitive information. For example, even though the user chooses to
suppress his/her membership to a political group, the adversary can look
for memberships disclosed by his/her friends. If a suﬃcient number of her
friends specify their membership to the same political group, an adversary,
assuming such groups tend to form cliques in the social networks, can predict
her membership with high probability. Besides these information retrieving
techniques, an adversary can also be a moderator or owner of such groups in
a SN, giving him/her the ability to collect more accurate data and to extend
his/her prediction radius among the SN.
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In this thesis, we propose a probabilistic inference attack, which predicts
the suppressed sensitive information from a highly suppressed SN with high
success rate given the network structure and the degree of correlation between
links and labels. The attack algorithm returns, for each node, a probability
that the node has a specific label (e.g., being a member of a group). The
sketch of the algorithm is as follows: For each node and label (e.g., sensitive
information) in the SN, the attack algorithm assigns a probability function for
the likelihood of the node to have the label. As the correlations are known,
the probability function for a node is defined in terms of probabilities of
neighbouring nodes (e.g., probabilities that they have the label). This creates
a system of equations to solve for the probabilities. In order to solve the large
system of equations, we propose an iterative algorithm. Basically, we start
with an initial state for all probabilities and iteratively update probabilities
based on the probability function. The algorithm returns the probabilities
when the system converges to a final state. We experimentally show that the
attack algorithm predicts the suppressed labels with high success rates even
in a highly suppressed social network.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 gives background
on social networks, followed by related work on data publishing. In Section
3, we present the motivation of the thesis and its contributions. Then we
describe our algorithm in detail in Section 4. Section 5 evaluates the proposed
attack algorithm based on test cases. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
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2 Background Information and Problem Defi-
nition
In this section, we formally define a social network in our domain, state what
the adversary knows, and formally present the problem definition.
2.1 Structure of Social Networks (SNs)
SNs can be observed as graphs [6], which consists of vertices or nodes and
edges. On a SN each user (i.e. profile owner) is a node on the graph and
any relationship between two users is an edge between them. Depending on
the SN these edges can vary in weight and directivity, e.g. the “friendship”
relationship between two users on a SN is an undirected edge, in contrast
to a “following” / “follower” [15] relationship being a directed edge. If the
SN has diﬀerent types of relationship among two users, then each type of
relationship can be represented with a diﬀerent weight on each edge.
Social Network: In our domain a social network is an undirected graph
SN = (V, E) where each node v ✏V is a user and e ✏E is an edge, defined
as e = (vi, vj) with vi, vj 2 V . There is an edge between vi and vj if and
only if there exist an e 2 E such that e = (vi, vj). A node can have multiple
edges to diﬀerent nodes, but there can’t be a node without having any edges.
For the network we have set of labels L representing a sensitive information.
For each user v 2 V , and label ` 2 L either the user has the label which we
denote as v.` = 1, or does not have the label which we denote as v.` = 0 .
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For example the set of labels could be:
L = {age > 30, location = Europe, political view = right} (2.1)
Each one of the labels will be referred to as `i and i = [1, 3]. Hence the
notation like v.`2 = 0 would mean that the user v is not in Europe, v.`3 = 1
would mean that v has a right-wing political view.
Suppressed Social Network: We say a suppressed social network
SN⇤ = (V 0, E 0) is derived from a social network SN = (V,E) iﬀ the fol-
lowing conditions are met: 1. There is a one to one correspondence between
v 2 V, e 2 E and v0 2 V 0, e0 2 E 0 2. For all matched v, v0, and ` 2 L; if
v.` = 1, either v0.` = 1 or v0.` = ⇤ (representing unknown) . Else if v.` = 0,
then v0.` = ⇤.
So a suppressed SN⇤ has the same network structure as its corresponding
SN . The only diﬃrence is some of the labels in SN⇤ is set to * representing
unknown. An example of an SN subgraph and its suppressed version can be
seen in Figure 1 and 2.
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Figure 1: Example of a Social Network
6
Figure 2: Suppressed version of SN from Figure 1
Neighbour Set: The  -neighbour set N v of a node v w.r.t. a label ` in a
social network SN = (V,E), is defined as the set of nodes that are connected
to v and have label  : N v = {v0|9e = (v, v0) 2 E, v0.` =  }. Nv returns all
neighbours of node v. (E.g., Nv = N0v [N1v [N⇤v )
In Figure 2, ⇤-neighbour set of v3, N⇤v3 = {v1, v6}. Similarly, N1v3 = {v2}.
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2.2 Problem Definition
In our domain, the data holder has a social network SN , however only a
suppressed version SN⇤ of SN is released due to preference based privacy
policy. To ease discussion, we assume, without loss of generality, the network
has only one label `. We assume the adversary has access to the following
information:
1. K1: The released suppressed network SN⇤.
2. K2: For a node v in the unsuppressed SN , P (v.` = 1 | |N1v ||Nv | = r) for all
r.
Note that the above adversary realistic. The knowledge in item 2 can be
obtained approximately by an adversary which is a user in the social network
that can see a subgraph of the network. Or it can be obtained from other
public networks or derived from domain knowledge. In this thesis, we propose
an attack algorithm for such an adversary that will compute the following
probability:
P (v.` = 1 | K1, K2)
2.3 Related Work
Privacy breach in published data sets was first shown in [39], where the au-
thors were able to obtain sensitive information of people from datasets with-
out unique identifier such as names, SSNs, · · · . Since then, many diﬀerent
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privacy models and anonymization techniques [34, 36] have been proposed
to prevent attacks by diﬀerent adversaries.
The first set of solutions for privacy preserving data publishing focused
primarily on tabular data in which each individual has a single record. We
now summarize the earlier research on tabular data publish but it should be
noted that since the SN data inherits a network structure and the location
of the individuals inside the structure gives away sensitive information, the
techniques proposed for tabular data cannot be used to de-identify SN data.
2.3.1 Tabular Data Publishing
Tabular data [12] is a way of organizing data in rows and columns, where rows
represent the records and columns represent the attributes of each record. In
contrast to graphs, individual records are not linked to each other. Every
record consists of many attributes and depending on the dataset there may
be a number of sensitive attributes1 [7] for each record. Table 1 and 2 is an
example for tabular data and its publishing methods, where all attributes are
considered as sensitive information. These attributes are considered sensitive
due to their nature for linking them with information on diﬀerent tables,
hence making them quasi-identifiers [40].
1is a personal information or opinion, that can be used to classify people into groups
after re-identification, e.g. diseases, memberships, etc.
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Table 1: A Fictitious Tabular Data
Name Age Sex Zip
John Doe 25 M 34141
Jane Doe 22 F 34140
Mark Johnson 34 M 34138
John Smith 19 M 34139
Sue Anne 43 F 34141
Table 2: Suppressed version of Data from Table 1
Name Age Sex Zip
* [25, 34] * 3414*
* [15, 24] * 3414*
* [25, 34] * 3413*
* [15, 24] * 3413*
* [35, 44] * 3414*
Anonymization techniques like k -anonymity [40, 39], `-diversity and  -
presence try to anonymize the tabular data before releasing them publicly,
but also try to keep a level of information available in the suppressed versions
for research. Meaning that, if the data is over-anonymized then the released
data will not contain any information on the table itself, opposed to under-
anonymizing which will lead to total re-identification of the data (Table 3,
4).
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Table 3: Over-anonymized Data
Name Age Sex Zip
* < 50 * 341**
* < 50 * 341**
* < 50 * 341**
* < 50 * 341**
* < 50 * 341**
Table 4: Under-anonymized Data
Name Age Sex Zip
*  25 M 34141
*  25 F 34140
*  35 M 34138
*  20 M 34139
*  45 F 34141
The anonymization techniques must be improved or revised according to
the new adversary knowledge. Adversaries gather information from all sorts
of sources and combine them into one big table for future use. Their main
goal in tabular formed published data is to link the suppressed records with
the data they have in hand.
Anonymization
k -Anonymity [40] is the first technique oﬀered to anonymize datasets
to make them resistant against re-identification [2]. The re-identification
process in tabular data publishing is accomplished through combining two
diﬀerent datasets with similar attributes along with diﬀerent anonymized
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attributes. Tabular data like U.S. voters’ lists were one of these records
and were prefered in view of the fact that anyone could buy it from the
government agencies. It contained sensitive information such as age, sex,
zip code, etc., and is used to match information from diﬀerent records to
re-identify the suppressed data.
When k -Anonymity is applied to these datasets, it ensures that any com-
bination of the quasi-identifiers would be matched to k indistinguishable
records. In other words, when a specific value is queried on the dataset,
the result set will contain k identical records for any attribute or queried at-
tribute set. This is achieved through domain generalization hierarchy (DGH)
[40] on each sensitive attribute list, where levels of generalization are viewed
as a tree. The lesser the height, i.e. towards the root, the more general values
are reached, as seen in Figure 3.
341**
3413*
34138 34139
3414*
34140 34141
[0-100]
[0-49]
[0-24] [25-49]
[50-100]
[50-74] [75-100]
Zip Code Age
Figure 3: Sample Domain Generalization Hierarchy
Using DGHs, the k -Anonymity algorithm will produce a suppressed dataset,
where any record would have (k   1) identical records regardless of any at-
tribute combination queried on.
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Despite this new technique Machanavajjhala, et. al. [34] has proven that
sensitive information is not secure to re-identification attacks and stresses the
adversary knowledge as the cause for this and proposes a new algorithm, `-
diversity. In k -anonymity, any query will return k indistinguishable records.
If these k records share the same value for a quasi-identifier it would mean
that this information is leaked. In other words if an adversary knows that
the person he/she is searching for is in the returned set of k records, then
the adversary can conclude that for that quasi-identifier the attribute value
is definite. To cover this defect, the authors propose the algorithm of `-
diversity, where in each set of k records each quasi-identifier has at least `
values for the sensitive attribute. This means that any attribute within the
k records is 1` diverse (Table 5, 6).
Table 5: A dataset without personal identifiers
Age Sex Zip Disease
16 M 34106 Cancer
25 F 34107 Flu
20 M 34107 Cancer
30 F 34106 Cold
Table 6: 2-anonymous and 2-diverse version of Table 5
Age Sex Zip Disease
[16-25] * 3410* Cancer
[16-25] * 3410* Flu
[20-30] * 3410* Cancer
[20-30] * 3410* Cold
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Yet, this new level of anonymity was also not suﬃcient, caused by contin-
uesly increasing adversary knowledge. As a result, the third major anonymiza-
tion method is oﬀered, again based on k-anonymity:  -presence [36]. On the
contrary of `-diversity,  -presence proves that for some sensitive information
it may not be possible to achieve `-diversity. If the sensitive data has only
two unique attributes vi.sen = {0, 1}, i.e. is either true or false for each
record, then it is impossible to reach `-diversity in k anonymous dataset. Let
us consider that there are n records in which m of them satisfy vi.sen = 1,
hence (n m) will be satisfying vi.sen = 0, and m   (n   m). According
to these values, the average value for ` would be calculated as ` = n mn ,
therefore making the data n mn -diverse. In order to overcome this deficiency
and to make the dataset resistant to publicly available sets of information,˙
the  -presence algorithm ensures that any record from the publicly avail-
able set will have the probability to be linked to the original data between
( min,  max). This algorithm relies on the adversary knowledge, however ad-
versary knowledge may increase in time and must be updated regularly for
the algorithm to produce the same level of anonymity every time.
As explained in this section the early phases of privacy protection was
based on tabular data publishing. The main threat for privacy was the diﬀer-
ent tabular data published with diﬀerent anonymizations, causing adversaries
to link the two corresponding tables in order re-identify the original data.
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2.3.2 Complex Data Publishing
Diﬀerentiating from tabular data, complex data is a set of records, where
multiple records combined create a new record set. Complex datasets can be
represented in multiple tabular forms or in diﬀerent forms, such as graphs.
The reason for the complexity comes from what information is stored within
the dataset and the relation among records, known as relational databases
[35]. Let us assume we have a table similar to Table 1 and we would also like
to store the spouse relationship. Hence using the data from the main table
we create a second tabular data, e.g. MarriedTo (Table 7).
Table 7: Tabular representation of spouse relationship
Spouse1 Spouse2
John Doe Jane Doe
Mark Johnson Tara Johnson
Brad Smith Sarah Smith
Compared to a single tabular data, complex datasets contain more infor-
mation on a single record, through the multiple relation sets between tabular
datas. The information and its meaning is being researched instensively un-
der the topic of data mining [25, 21]. Using data mining techniques the
information within the tables are interpreted into meaningful conclusions.
For example in a supermarket each transaction could point out diﬀerent in-
formation using correlating information, such as “People who buy diapers also
buy milk”. Such and more examples could be found even in daily use within
most data.
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Complex data is also being studied for privacy because most datasets
can be used by adversaries for background knowledge for data mining ap-
plications. One way to anonymize the data is using the k -anonymity tech-
nique on multiple and related tables [37]. However datasets may diﬀer and
only k -anonymity would not be enough to securely publish the data. Espe-
cially datasets like spatio-temporal data [20] are the most important ones.
They store coordinates and timestamps for a person, which can be collected
through GPS-enabled devices, such as GPS navigator, smartphone, GSM
carrier, digital cameras, etc. These informations can be expressed in a multi-
relational table, where one table would hold the information on the individual
(Table 1) and the other would hold the paths as coordinates (Table 8). In
Table 8 the paths are stored as a comma-seperated format and each element
of it, is a coordinate in (xi, yi, ti) format, where xi is the horizontal- and yi
is the vertical displacement and ti is the timestamp at which the person was
located at those coordinates.
Table 8: Path coordinates in spatio-temporal data
ID Path
1 {(x1, y1, t1) , (x2, y2, t2) , (x3,, y3, t3)}
2 {(x12, y12, t12) , (x13, y13, t13) , (x14,, y14, t14) , (x15, y15, t15)}
As mentioned above there are adversaries for this information, too. It
is proven that even when anonymized, paths of individuals can be retrieved
[30, 32, 31]. This information can be used against the person to leak private
information, such as “Person X is going to the hospital every week” will
translate into “Possible Chronic Disease Carrier” by an insurance company.
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The problem of anonymizing the data comes from its information. Each
coordinate must be handled individually in order to suppress key information,
such that an adversary can not recreate the original path correctly. So the
path becomes a function on the x, y-coordinate system and there may be
many ways to recreate the path. One way to visualize the paths could also
be graphing them onto a map, but graphs are mostly used to display networks
rather than directional single-line paths.
2.3.3 SN Data Publishing
Once SNs became popular among internet users, the number of accounts
increased and SNs were holding more data than any other datasets. Hence
adversaries created crawlers [38] to harvest the data on SNs, but they weren’t
just storing them in their previously created tabular data, they were also
storing it in a graph form in order to analyze the SN. The main reason
for that is, that each user acount is connected with some other accounts,
which makes inference between these connected users possible. This can
be explained by the graph structure of the SNs, where the SN is not just
a collection of profiles row-by-row, but is an interconnected network where
people from same interest groups, same schools, same locations, etc. relate
to each other by friendship links. Also when opening an account for the
first time in a SN, the privacy settings are always set as public by default.
During the time the user figures out, how to set his/her privacy preferences
most of his/her sensitive data, e.g. age, sex, location, education, religious
and political views, etc. can be retrieved by adversaries.
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Adversaries change by type or the information they are seeking for, though
the information they retrieve gets summoned and distributed through the in-
ternet. Inexperienced adversaries search the SNs by jumping through links
while more advanced ones use crawlers to harvest the data. Crawlers are
web scripts which do the same job as the inexperienced adversaries in an
automated fashion.
In the recent years many publishing methods for SN data has been dis-
cussed [26, 41, 42]. The main goal of these anonymization-based publishing
techniques were also creating a version of the original graph that would mimic
the relationships and label distribution of its source. Let SN be the original
network and SN⇤ be a anonymized version of it, i.e. SN⇤ ⇢ SN . The de-
sired SN⇤ would then be such that the probability of identifying any node
on SN given SN⇤ is smaller than a threshold value " (Equation 2.2) . In the
mean time, the anonymized network SN⇤ must also return the same proba-
bilistic results as the original network SN for each query, again with a very
small noise factor   (Equation 2.4). N’ will only return results for countable
queries, e.g. “Probability of any node vi having label `j = 1” (Equation 2.3),
due to the individual privacy factors it has to meet.
P (vi | N) < ", vi 2 N 0 (2.2)
q ⌘ [vi.`j = {1}] (2.3)
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Q(q, N) = Q(q, N 0)±  (2.4)
When publishing graph data, the key of anonymization does not rely on
suppressing labels of vertices, instead it considers the position of the vertices,
which is expressed through its neighbours [42]. Neighbours are the vertices
that are linked to a node vi through the edges. For instance in Figure 1, the
node v3 has the neighbours {v1, v2, v6} over the edges {e13, e23, e36}. Back-
strom, et. al. [16] explains passive and active attacks using the neighbouring
property of the SNs. Adversaries may actively use the SN and create a small
group of network, which they would match to the graph that is going to be
publicly published. If they are able to find their group within the anonymized
version of the graph they would be able to extend from that point to label
anonymized nodes.
Hay, et. al. [26] uses perturbation on links in order to obscure the neigh-
bouring relationships, causing the graph to be more securely anonymized.
They have concentrated on anonymizing the edges, by removing or adding
edges in order to create similar vertices based on an algorithm. Similarly
Zhou and Pei [42] create a k -anonymous graph based on the neighbours of
vertices, i.e. making k identical nodes for any query. Diﬀerentiating from
these two researches, Wei, et. al. [41] anonymize both the labels and the
neighbours of the nodes. They propose three algorithms to achieve their
anonymization. First they create subgraphs, in which each node has the
same label. Following this step, they add or remove edges based on sub-
graph average such that at the end, each node has exactly the same degree
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of its neighbours. Finally, they conclude by anonymizing the connectivity
among subgraphs, again based on k -anonymity. Despite these anonymiza-
tion methods, we concentrate on such nodes that do not contain any label
at all. In addition to this fact, anonymized graph data is not what the ad-
versaries are going to deal in our proposed method because we assume, that
the adversaries collect their data with crawlers. Using crawler data with
our algorithm we will infer on the graph. Hence no third party anonymized
published data will be used.
It was He, et. al. [27] that brought the idea of inference into SNs. In their
research they have assumed that people in a SN tend to build relationships
with others such as classmates, co-workers, fellow townsman, etc. Using
these relationships and the Bayesian network [28, 29, 24] representation, they
inferred on one label of each node. They assumed that the adversary would
be aware of one’s content of relationships with others, i.e. the adversary is
aware of all the neighbours, and social groups of the neighbours of the given
vi 2 V . Using this information, they prove that for a given node vi they infer
on the labels `j by analyzing the correct group of neighbours of it. Thus, for
each node of vi.`j = ⇤, they select the neighbours with the correct relevance
to this label and come to a decision based on this deductive algorithm. In
contrast to He, et. al. [27], our inference algorithm does not concentrate
on specific groups to infer on labels of nodes, this is due to the fact that we
assume adversary does not have the knowledge of which node belonging to
which social group.
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Recently Lindamood, et. al. [33] showed that inference attacks are a
major threat to SNs. They proposed a classification algorithm and a way to
prevent inference attacks. They were able to keep the classification algorithm
from classifying by looking at the information available after removal of edges
and some label information. Basically, by removing edges between the nodes
and suppressing labels on the nodes they made the classification algorithm
to come to a position where it can’t make an decision.
The authors [33] collect the data through a SN crawler, which is described
in [38, 14]. They perform three diﬀerent tests in order to reach the most
attack tollerant version of suppression. When removing 10 links per node
and 10 labels from each node the classifier ends up in an decision to make
between 0.52 and 0.48, which in this case is impossible to infer about the
decision of any node. We diﬀer from this work right from the beginning
because they are suppressing data which is collected through crawlers. What
we want to show is that after adversary collects the data using a crawler it
is possible to infer on the remaining unidentified nodes and their labels.
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3 Motivation and Contribution of the Thesis
This section includes information on why we selected this subject and what
contributions we made.
3.1 Motivation
As SNs come to be popular, many diﬀerent ways of collecting data became
possible. Despite all the preference-based privacy options, Social Network
systems are still weak in protecting personal sensitive data. Although some
algorithms have been oﬀered on suppressing networks, they always assumed
that these networks consist only of edges and nodes. These algorithms ignore
the adversaries that try to recover some key sensitive information about that
node.
As described in Section 2.3, the relationships among users can point out
some key information about the connected parties. If the relationship be-
tween some users is more dense, the information retrieved among them can
be more precise, regardless of the number of captured profiles. Even if a user
suppresses all of his/her sensitive information to any third party, i.e. anyone
besides his/her friends can not see any info on the profile, his/her friends’
information may point out about his/her sensitive facts, like age, location,
political view, etc.
The inference possibility of using information on neighbouring nodes does
not need much of an adversary knowledge; however the publicly available
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data is more than adequate to conclude such an inference attack. The idea
behind inference depends on the fact that people can not control what others
are sharing and how this information can relate to their private data. One
may decide to not share a fact about his/her personal life, but it can be
shared publicly by other users in many diﬀerent ways. Some may give a per-
sonal fact about him/her self, that can unknowingly or willingly depict other
related users. This kind of privacy breaches are called neighbour sharing,
because an adversary is informed about a sensitive information of an user by
a neighbouring node.
This breach in privacy is detected by active adversaries, which not only
rely on data, that is gathered by crawlers, but also personally view accounts
for such information. The adversary is aware of such situations due to the
fact that in social networks people may act on emotional factors and share
some key information about their neighbours. However, most of the time
such neighbour sharing is not based on emotional factors, where users act
out without thinking of the consequences, in contrast it is the basic informa-
tion that the user shares. In other words, people tend to have friends and
relations that are based on common factors, such as school, work, political
view, religious view, sexual orientation, etc. Using this kind of related neigh-
bours the adversary can guess on information that is suppressed by some
users.
Our primary objective is to use this structure of relationships and prove
that it is possible to infer on suppressed information without using any other
data sets or related information.
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3.2 Contribution of the Thesis
What we did is, we try to show that in SNs not sharing any information
is not a definite solution for privacy protection. Among the proposed net-
work suppression algorithms, the main issue is to anonymize the network in
such a way that it still makes sense and carries similar information of the
original network N. We are going to prove that if the data holds correlated
information to its original state, defined by Equation 2.4, then simple adver-
sary knowledge may be enough to recover key information on each person
individually.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, people that are neighbours have a high pos-
sibility of having common factors or having the same information on one or
more cases. When considering big social networks, it would be very diﬃcult
to view each account for neighbour sharing. Hence using the similar details
among users would be a much more eﬃcient way to conclude our proposal.
In the early phases, we concentrated on special interest groups on SNs,
which shows the persons belonging to an idea or ideological group. This
method was selected as the primary adversary behaviour in order to clas-
sify people, even if their profiles were closed to outside viewing. However,
this produced a low level of connectivity among users. The low level of
connectivity means, that through the special interest groups we were able
to access many peoples key information, but the relations among them and
their mutual relations was very low to use in an inference attack. Therefore,
we changed our objective to the network itself, rather than the information
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providing entity, in our case the special interest groups. When using the net-
work itself the number of mutual neighbours among the vertices increases,
which will allow better results within each subgraph. In other words, the
more related or connected the networks is the better it can be inferred.
Our adversary knowledge was based on only the measurable fact of ten-
dency of users connecting to users with similar formations. When considering
each label seperately adversaries can easily conclude to the ratio of connec-
tions, i.e. edges, among users that have or not have the label, as in Equations
3.1 and 3.2.
P (vj, ` = 1 | vi.` = 1) (3.1)
P (vj.` = 1 | vi.` = 0) (3.2)
Although we started our research in the direction of a binomial distri-
bution [1] attack, it evolved into a multinomial inference attack due to the
change in information source.
We developed a probabilistic inference attack that can recover a highly
suppressed SN. We assumed that an average adversary is capable of creat-
ing a crawler for a SN. Although many accounts would be closed to public
viewing, the adversary may use his/her account for the crawler to retrieve
better results. Many researches on SNs [33, 27] did also produce a crawler,
returning more than 50000 accounts in each case. Hence the assumed adver-
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sary knowledge is fair in our case. We probabilistcally re-identify the label
values of each node individually by looking at their neighbours that do not
have suppressed labels.
Each node, vi, may or may not have neighbours with suppressed label `j;
however, we can conclude in both of the situations the value of vi.`j. The
key point here is that the adversary has the knowledge of label distribution
within the SN or sub-SN, meaning that the adversary knows by ratio how
many of which label is present in the graph (Equation 3.3). By knowing this
value the adversary can attack the suppressed graph SN⇤ and re-identify the
graph even if edges are removed or perturbed, too.
R` =
| vi.` = 0 |
| vi.` = 1 | (3.3)
Rl=0 =
|vi.` = 0|
n
(3.4)
R`=1 =
|vi.` = 1|
n
(3.5)
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4 Proposed Probabilistic Inference Attack (PIA)
This section will explain our contribution in detail. First, we will define our
assumptions. Then we will describe the evolution of our methods. Finally,
we will explain our algorithm in detail.
4.1 Methodology
Our aim is, when given K1, K2, to find the probability for any suppressed
node, of having label 1. However, this would have caused a recursive call
cycle as the number of suppressed nodes increased. If a suppressed node has
a suppressed neighbour, that also has suppressed neighbours and continuing
like this, we will recursively reach every node by neighbour relations and
keep on going until we reach the last node or worst, if there is a cycle,
never reach an end. Hence we changed our model to a heuristic one, where
instead of considering all suppressed nodes at once, we look one by one
and update probabilities accordingly. The heuristic model, which will be
explained shortly, relies on single comparisons and is faster. So our proposed
algorithm works in an iterative mode using the distribution of the labels, but
consists of diﬀerent phases for computing the inference rates.
We assume that we obtained a part of a SN with n nodes, that can be
classified into m labels.
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Table 9: Defined Symbols used in the algorithm
Value Symbol
Number of nodes n
Number of labels m
Label set `
Unique node vi
List of nodes L[n]
Number of connections of node Ni
Connected nodes of node vi Fij
Unique connection of a node NFk
Unique label `j
Ratio of connections a node having same label value RNj
Label of node vi.`
Inference ratio of a node IRN i
Anonymization rate A
4.1.1 Anonymization Process
This anonymization process is developed for testing of the attack algorithm,
which will be explained in Section 4.2. While creating the network graph or
getting it as an input by randomly selecting some nodes anonymization can
be performed. In Algorithm 6 we showed how a single label classification
can be generated. Using the same algorithm with an addition we can create
an anonymized version of the network. It would have the same number of
friends per node and the same connections.
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We will use a user input to determine the rate of anonymization we will
produce. If a random value is smaller than the rate then, that node will be
anonymized, except it would be stored in a diﬀerent list. It is detailed in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Anonymization Process in Network Generation
(1) a 0
(2) while a < n do
(3) b readLineFromFile(filePath)
(4) numberOfFriends random(n/100)
(5) label  random(0, 1)
(6) if label < P (`) then
(7) nodeLabel  0
(8) else then
(9) nodeLabel  1
(10) end if
(11) anonymization random(0, 1)
(12) if anonymization < A then
(13) L0[a] node(b, ⇤, numberOfFriends)
(14) else then
(15) L0[a] node(b, nodeLabel, numberOfFriends)
(16) end if
(17) L[a] node(b, nodeLabel, numberOfFriends)
(18) a a+ 1
(19) end while
When using real data instead of generated synthetic data, then this pro-
cess is done after the nodes are created. This is because of the diﬀerentiating
input methods. In the real data version, each node has a seperate file for its
connections, also nodes from each label outcome are seperated in diﬀerent
files, e.g. class1.txt, class2.txt, etc. In addition to that, since these parts
of the algorithm are for generating test cases, they will be excluded when a
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real anonymized dataset is going to be used. As mentioned in Section 2 the
suppressed data will mimic the original data, due to the reason that even
when anonymized this set of records must make sense, without breaching the
privacy of individuals.
4.2 Algorithm
In this section we will describe the PIA algorithm in depth. The PIA algo-
rithm shown in Algorithm 4 is designed for a singe label classification, e.g.
{age<30, age>=30}, {left-wing, right-wing}, etc. This algorithm runs on the
anonymized network data. It searches for anonymous nodes and calculates
its probability of belonging to a class.
Our algorithm consists of three parts. First, it finds the unlabeled nodes
in the network. After that for each unlabeled node, it checks, how many
unlabeled/suppressed friends the node has, depending on the outcome it
choses one of two probability functions and computes the probability of this
node belonging to a class. Finally, after each unlabeled node has computed
a probability, it compares these with the threshold values and comes to a
decision about the node.
The first part of the algorithm, shown in Algorithm 2, works in an itera-
tive fashion. It goes over the list of nodes, and searches for the ones that are
suppressed, explained as in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 2 Get Suppressed Nodes
(1) a 0
(2) while a < n do
(3) if Fia.` = ⇤ then
(4) L0.push(L[a])
(5) end if
(6) a a+ 1
(7) end while
(8) return L0
Algorithm 3 Total number of suppressed nodes in the graph
(1) a 0
(2) i 0
(3) b 0
(4) while i < n do
(5) while a < Ni do
(6) if Fia.` = ⇤ then
(7) b b+ 1
(8) end if
(9) a a+ 1
(10) end while
(11) i i+ 1
(12) end while
(13) return b
The second part of the algorithm uses the nodes returned from part 1 with
two diﬀerent probability equations, depending on the number of suppressed
connections the selected node has. If the node in question isn’t connected to
any other suppressed node, then the inference is based purely on the distri-
bution of its connected peers. As equation 4.1 describes, we check the labels
of each connected node to determine the connectivity of our selected node
to this label. Again it is a single label classification version of the equation.
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Then by comparing these values with each other and the probabilities of each
class occurance rates, as in Equation 4.2, we can infer the label value this
node belongs to.
8><>:c1 = N
0
vi
c2 = N1vi
(4.1)
c1
c2
8><>:
>
1 K12,vi
1 K02,vi
) vi.` = 0
<
1 K12,vi
1 K02,vi
) vi.` = 1
(4.2)
Aside from this case, a node may be connected to other suppressed nodes.
In this scenerio the ratio equation changes, which also varies according to the
connected nodes’ label values. Depending on the count of nodes’ label values
from Equation 4.1 we choose one of the ratio calculation methods. If c1 > c2
then we use Equation 4.3. If c2 > c1 then we use Equation 4.5. The result
of these equations are kept in a diﬀerent list and will be updated after each
turn for all suppressed nodes are finished.
IRN 0i = IRNm ⇥
⇣
| N0vi | +
PNvi
t=0 IRNt
⌘
| Nvi |
+ (1  IRNm)⇥W1 (4.3)
W1 =
0@1 
⇣
| N1vi | +
PNvi
t=0 IRNt
⌘
| Nvi |
1A (4.4)
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IRN 0i = IRNm ⇥
⇣
| N1vi | +
PNvi
t=0 IRNt
⌘
| Nvi |
+ (1  IRNm)⇥W0 (4.5)
W0 =
0@1 
⇣
| N0vi | +
PNvi
t=0 IRNt
⌘
| Nvi |
1A (4.6)
The key element of the PIA algorithm is that it runs iteratively and as it
repeats itself the IRN for each node converges to a value. After the algorithm
is finished these ratios would be used to compare it with the threshold values.
In Algorithm 4 we can see that the previously mentioned equations are called
within the algorithm using the names Eq—4.X(). Until line (6) of the PIA
algorithm we handle the case, where the suppressed node has no anonymized
connections.
The second case, in which a node has also suppressed connections, is
run iteratively in order to see the convergence of the inference ratio for each
anonymous node. If a suppressed node vi is connected to another suppressed
node vj then during the runtime of the algorithm the new value of IRNi is
calculated w.r.t. IRNj and vice versa shown in Equation 4.3 and 4.5. Since
it utilizes a probabilistic method, the more this equation is calculated at a
single step the more precise the ratio converges. When the suppression rate
is low it important that this part of the algorithm iterates suﬃcient number
of times, since the size of the set of suppressed nodes with connections to
other suppressed nodes will be low, and we must guarantee that for each
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such node the algorithm iterates z times, where z is the user input for the
minimal iteration count.
34
Algorithm 4 Probabilistic Inference Attack
(1) a 0
(2) while a < n do
(3) x[] getSuppressedNodes(va)
(4) if count(x[]) = 0 then
(5) Eq—4.2 (Eq—4.1(na))
(6) else then
(7) y  0
(8) z  0
(9) while z < 15 do
(10) y  0
(11) while y < count(x[]) do
(12) cr[] Eq—4.1(na)
(13) if cr[0] > cr[1] then
(14) Eq—4.3(na, x[y])
(15) crTemp[] Eq—4.1(x[y])
(16) if crTemp[0] > crTemp[1] then
(17) Eq—4.3(x[y], va)
(18) else then
(19) Eq—4.5(x[y], va)
(20) end if
(21) else then
(22) Eq—4.5(va, x[y])
(23) crTemp[] Eq—4.1(x[y])
(24) if crTemp[0] > crTemp[1] then
(25) Eq—4.3(x[y], va)
(26) else then
(27) Eq—4.5(x[y], va)
(28) end if
(29) end if
(30) y  y + 1
(31) end while
(32) z  z + 1
(33) end while
(34) end if
(35) a a+ 1
(36) end while
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As we can see each pair of suppressed neighbours are calculated together.
In other words, for each vi.` = ⇤ and e = (vi, vj) where j 2 N and vj.` = ⇤
we will write the equation 4.3 or 4.5 and recalculate it z times. If we had
gone with the deterministic model, we would have to write the equation
such that, that each vj.` = ⇤ should be a part of it. In the mean time
we should also write the eqution in the same loop for each vj and their
suppressed neighbours, and then their neighbours, too. As we can understand
this method will call itself recursively to find all suppressed vertices of a give
vi.` = ⇤. Hence the runtime diﬀerence will increase polynomially between the
two algorithms and there is the probability of creating an infinite recursion
in the deterministic algorithm.
Once the algorithm runs and calculates each suppressed nodes’ probabilis-
tic value, the inference decision is based on two thresholds. The threshold
selection is based on the fact of seperation of probabilities each suppressed
vertice will have after the algorithm runs. We will have two thresholds, one to
represent ` = 0 for a given vertice and the other to represent ` = 1 again for
any given vertice. Our aim is to succeed in seperating the probabilities very
distinctly, hence when choosing a very small and a very big threshold we will
identify each vertices’ label value with the highest accuracy. For example, if
the threshold values are chosen as tsmall = 0.25 and tlarge = 0.75 and there is
no or very few vertices inbetween, then we say we have concluded the labels
with high accuracy for each vertice. Any probability between the thresholds
will be considered as non inferable.
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Depending on the relation between vertices that have the label or not
(Equation 3.3), the threshold values can be changed. The values can converge
to each other at tsmall = tlarge = 0.5. The more apart these values are with
low error rates then the seperation of labels is more precise and accurate.
4.3 Complexity Analysis
In our algorithm we expect to see a polynomial increase of degree 2, in other
words our algorithm will run in O (n2). The reason for this is the two-way
calculation of the PIA algorithm. As mentioned in Section 2.1, if a sup-
pressed node vi is neighbours with other suppressed nodes, e.g. vj, then PIA
calculates the new probability (Equation 4.3 or 4.5) of both vertices. Between
lines (13)-(20), (21)-(28) of Algorithm 4 we can see that depending on the
number of friends with ` = 0 and ` = 1 the Equation 4.3 or 4.5 is calculated
for both set of nodes: (vi, vj) ^ (vj, vi). When the number of suppressed
nodes increases the possibility of a node vi having more than 1 suppressed
neighbour nodes. Considering that this calculation is repeated iteratively for
each suppressed node z-many times, the amount of calculation gets bigger
and bigger. The complexity of it can be seen in Equation 4.7, which proves
that when the total number of suppressed nodes (Algorithm 3) increases the
number of suppressed nodes per suppressed node vi (| Algorithm 2 |) also
increases. Since the second part is repeated z times, in total the number
of calculations increases exponentially. Considering the values from Table
10 and 13 we can conclude Equation 4.7 into Equation 4.8, which gives a
numerical representation of the complexity using the average number of con-
37
nections.  (n, z) calculates the constant variables for a given network size n
and iteration count z.
Algorithm—3⇥ [z ⇥ (2⇥ (| Algorithm—2(vi) |))] (4.7)
(n⇥As)⇥ [z ⇥ 2⇥ (averageNumberOfEdges⇥ As)] = A2s ⇥ (n, z) (4.8)
Table 10: Facts & Figures for synthetic data
Value
Count of ` = 0 17500
Count of ` = 1 7500
Average number of friends 8vi ⇠ 18.5
Minimum number of friends 8vi 5
Maximum number of friends 8vi 33
Table 11: Facts & Figures for real data
Value
Count of ` = 0 93
Count of ` = 1 690
Average number of friends 8vi ⇠ 39.55
Total connectivity | eij | 30970
Maximum number of mutual friends between v1 and vi 207
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Considering the complexity eqution (Equation 4.7) both synthetic and
real data application of PIA have the same complexity, yet the real data
complexity functions’ coeﬃcient  (nreal, z) is smaller. Using Equations 4.9
and 4.10 we prove the diﬀerence of complexity between synthetic and real
data, i.e. between  synth and real (Equation 4.11).
nreal
nsynth
=
783
25000
⇡ 0.031 (4.9)
AverageFriendCountreal
AverageFriendCountsynth
=
39.55
18.5
⇡ 2.14 (4.10)
 (nreal, z) = Eq—4.9⇥Eq—4.10⇥  (nsynth, z) ⇡ 0.67⇥  (nsynth, z) (4.11)
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5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we will discuss our test cases and the results of recovering the
information using probabilistic inference attack, PIA.
5.1 Test Bench
We have developed our algorithm in Eclipse [22], in order to have a cross-
platform application. Any computer on JRE 1.5 or newer is able to run the
code.
Besides, the simulations are run on a personal computer with the following
specifications:
• Mac OS X 10.7 (x86/64)
• Intel Core 2 Duo Processor at 2.4GHz
• 4 GB 667 MHz DDR2 SDRAM
• JRE 1.5
• Eclipse 3.6 “Helios”
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5.2 Test Cases
As mentioned in Section 4.1, we used two diﬀerent datasets. One was gen-
erated from a Facebook [3] crawler data [18] and the other one is populated
from a Facebook account.
5.2.1 Synthetic Data Creation
To create a random network, a list of node names can be used. In our case,
we used a file, publicly known as the “100 Million Facebook List” [18], which
is a text file with just above hundred million usernames and the number of
repetitions of these usernames, shown in Table12. The original username list
consists of 170879859 names and their links.
Table 12: Part of file for synthetic data creation
17204 john smith
7440 david smith
7200 michael smith
6784 chris smith
6371 mike smith
6149 arun kumar
5980 james smith
5939 amit kumar
Using this data, we can generate a seperate file with n records. We
randomly select a number in the range [0, 100128458] and retrieve the record
on that line. According to the occurance number, we project it to the size
41
of data we are generating, which is n. The details can be examined from
Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Random Network Generator with n records
(1) a 0
(2) x 100128458
(3) y  170879859
(4) while a < n do
(5) b random(x)
(6) c[] readLine(filePath, b)
(7) repeatCount c[0]⇥ny
(8) z  0
(9) while z < repeatCount do
(10) writeToF ile(outputF ile, c[1])
(11) z  z + 1
(12) end while
(13) a a+ 1
(14) end while
The generated output file alone would not be enough to run the test. In
order to map this file to a network we must also generate connections between
the nodes. In addition to that a classification must be done while converting
the file into a network. For each node created we randomly select how many
friends, i.e. connections, it would have, which is shown in Algorithm 6. User
will input how many labels there will be and their probabilities. According
to these probabilities each node will have a label or set of labels. After all
nodes are created the number of friendship connection are fulfilled. During
this process user input decides on the correlations of the connections, i.e. the
user sets how many of which class the node will have a connection to. This
part is explained in Algorithm 7.
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Algorithm 6 Random Friendship Generation with single label
(1) a 0
(2) while a < n do
(3) b readLineFromFile(filePath)
(4) numberOfFriends random(n/100)
(5) `abel  random(0, 1)
(6) if label < P (`) then
(7) nodeLabel  0
(8) else then
(9) nodeLabel  1
(10) end if
(11) L[a] node(b, nodeLabel, numberOfFriends)
(12) a a+ 1
(13) end while
Using Algorithm 5 we can generate a smaller version of the source. Since
the source is a very big data in size, (approx. 2.5GB) read operation, com-
bined with the random line seek is very costly. We were able to read a random
line and append it to the new file in 8.93 seconds on average. Thus creating
a list of 25000 nodes took around 62 hours (Figure 4). This algorithm is the
most costly part of the whole project.
In order to mimic the actual data, we analyzed the facts of Facebook from
back the time, in which this crawler was active. First, a twenty-five-thousand
line data is generated by using Algorithm 5. The generated data is read and
converted into a graph using the facts from Table 10 and with Algorithms
6 and 7. These values are calculated according to the ratio of the size of
generated data against the size of the SN itself [11]. Then these values are
randomly selected for suppression as shown in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 7 Connection Generator with single label
(1) a 0
(2) b 0
(3) x 0
(4) while a < n do
(5) while b < Na do
(6) sameLabelConnections Na ⇥RNvi.`
(7) while c = va do
(8) c random(n)
(9) if vc.` = va.` and
x < sameLabelConnections then
(10) addConnection(va, vc)
(11) x x+ 1
(12) else if x >= sameLabelConnections and
vc.` 6= va.` then
(13) addConnection(na, nc)
(14) end if
(15) end while
(16) b b+ 1
(17) end while
(18) b 0
(19) a a+ 1
(20) end while
5.2.2 Real Data
The real data is based on one Facebook account. The friends of the account
and the mutual friend list for each of the friends of the account have been
gathered. The list of friends are stored in a file, in which every friends’ user-
ID, that acts as a unique key [13] for each account on Facebook, is stored.
Assume v1 is the account that the information is harvested from, and the
mutual friends of a friend vi of v1 is stored just like the friends list file.
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Figure 4: Algorithm 5 runtime
In order to gather this information, a crawler script is run on the account
of v1. The crawler uses the Graph API [5] and the REST API [10] from the
Facebook Developers library [4]. First the crawler retrives the user-ID’s of
the given account and then for each returned user-ID it collects the mutual
friends list (Algorithm 8). This data is also suppressed randomly according
to Algorithm 1. Table 11 shows the important values of this dataset.
5.3 Results
In this section present the results of the tests according to the datasets men-
tioned above. For each dataset, we show the success rate and the runtime of
the attack algorithm. We test both datasets with diﬀerent suppression rates.
We test the PIA algorithm based on a single-label inference. In other words,
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Algorithm 8 The Facebook Crawler
(1) friendList[] friends.get(accountID)
(2) i 0
(3) while friendID  friendsList[i] do
(4) mutualList[] 
friends.getMutualFriends(accountID, friendID)
(5) writeToFile(accountIDFile, friendID)
(6) j  0
(7) while mutualID  mutualList[j] do
(8) writeToFile(friendIDFile, mutualID)
(9) j  j + 1
(10) end while
(11) i i+ 1
(12) end while
the aim is to determine a single information of each node like “Is this person
an enrolled student”. If the person is an active student vi.` = 1 will hold and
if opposite then vi.` = 0 will hold.
5.3.1 Synthetic Data Results
As described in Table 10, the synthetic data has 25000 nodes and on average
each node has 18.5 edges. The minimum number of friends on any node is
5 and the maximum is 33. In this test case 70% of the data generated has
` = 0. The average time required for generating the graph and suppressing
it is around 0.67 seconds.
To evaluate performance, we vary the number of suppressed nodes in the
synthetic data and in Table 13 plot the average time it takes to run the PIA
algorithm. Visualizing the runtimes in Figure 5 shows that the runtime of the
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PIA algorithm increases, with increasing suppression rates, as a polynomial
function [9] of degree 2, i.e. O (n2).
Table 13: Suppression rates for synthetic data
A % Avg. time (sec)
A1 0.15 1.489
A2 0.25 5.273
A3 0.35 14.759
A4 0.50 33.568
A5 0.60 58.663
A6 0.75 116.567
A7 0.875 204.382
Figure 5: Run Time of PIA with Synthetic Data
47
Nevertheless when running a suppression or re-identification algorithm,
time is not the major issue, due to the fact that these algorithms have to be
executed only once. But when these algorithms operate only once for every
dataset the key issue becomes that the end product matches the expectations
of its context. Since the PIA algorithm is trying to re-identify labels of nodes
it is important that it should finish its execution with very low rate of errors.
We can see in Figures 6 and 7, that the error rate (i.e. the percentage of node
labels predicted incorrectly) also has a polynomial equation of degree 2. We
see that as the suppression rate As increases the error rate increases as well.
This is because the more knowledge the adversary has, the less errors would
be made in the re-identification process since there are more known nodes
that can be used to infer on the suppressed nodes. In the results of PIA
algorithm, we can clearly see that there is a turning point after A = 0.75,
where the error rates take a steep rise. However, even when the graph is 75%
suppressed the total number of falsely identified nodes are just over 1000, i.e.
the error rate is slightly over 5%. In other words PIA was able to re-identify
⇡ 17250 of 18500 suppressed nodes and match almost 23750 nodes exactly
to the original SN.
In order to evaluate the success rate , we must compare the results with
the a naive adversary. Let us assume that there is another adversary that
also knows 70% of all nodes have the label vi.` = 0. Using this fact the
adversary could try to re-identify all label, but infers all vi.` = 1 as vi.` = 0,
reaching the biggest possible error rate, 30%. Hence when we plot our results
for very high rates of suppression, we are very far away from the worst case
error rate 30%.
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Looking at the label outcomes individually (Figure 8) shows an inharmo-
nious error rate. Although the result of ` = 0 mimics the overall results, the
error rates of ` = 1 are on a diﬀerent path. This is caused by the outcome
of the distribution between ` = 0 and ` = 1, which is in this case 70% and
30%, respectively. One must also take into account that people with ` = 1
also tend to be connected to people with also ` = 1. Since the vertices with
vi.` = 1 are less in number, and internally connected with each other, the
error rate diﬀerence heightens slower.
Figure 6: Erroneous Node Count with Synthetic Data
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Figure 7: Erroneous Node Percentage with Synthetic Data
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Figure 8: Erroneous Node Percentage in Synthetic Data for label outcome
5.3.2 Real Data Results
Although the real world data is small in size, its tests have similar outcomes
as the ones on the synthetic data. Table 11 describes the smaller size, nreal =
783. We must point out that the average number of connection per node vi
is approximately 40, in contrast to the 18.5 of the synthetic data. The reason
for this situation is that the real data is populated from one singular profile
and its mutual relations with other nodes. The doubling in node connectivity
increases the precision of the inference, despite the small size of the graph.
In this test the label ` = 1 represents nodes with age  30.
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The runtime of PIA with the smaller real data shows also a polynomial
increase with the increasing Ai value (Table 14). Comparing Figure 9 with
Figure 5 one can conclude that the degree of the polynomial is slightly smaller
in the real data case.
Table 14: Suppression rates for real data
A % Avg. time (sec)
A1 0.15 0.157
A2 0.25 0.350
A3 0.35 0.621
A4 0.50 1.191
A5 0.60 1.669
A6 0.75 2.254
A7 0.875 3.229
Figure 9: Run Time of PIA with Real Data
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In the real world dataset test we see (Figures 10 and 11) a more linear
rate of increase in the erroneous node count. As explained this is caused by
the size of the data (Equations 4.8 and 4.11) and distribution of the labels. In
the synthetic data test the distribution was P (vi.` = 0 | N) = 0.7, and in this
real data test it is P (vi.` = 1 | N) = 0.88. Altogether create this linearity,
however choosing a diﬀerent label may increase the complexity again towards
a degree 2 polynomial, but in the case O(nx) as limP (vi.`|N)!1x ! 1, where
x 2 [1, 2]. Besides these the PIA algorithm manages to re-identify more than
90% of the graph even when the suppression rate was A = 0.75.
Figure 10: Erroneous Node Count with Real Data
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Figure 11: Erroneous Node Percentage with Real Data
Figure 12 shows that both lines are going to the opposite direction, due
to the fact that with smaller data the error rates increase faster. If the worst
case of P (vi.` = 0 | K1, K2) = 0.12 is calculated as vi.` = 1. This is due
to the fact, that even when the entire graph is suppressed the adversary is
aware of P (vi.` = 1 | N) = 0.88 and P (vi.` = 0 | N) = 0.12. Hence the
PIA algorithm would favour vi.` = 1 almost entirely during its runtime, not
taking the probability of ` = 0.12 into account. In such a case the graph
would be re-identified with label ` = 1, inferring all 93 of ` = 0 incorrectly
and therefore the error rate would converge to 100% for all vi.` = 0 and to
0% for all .
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Figure 12: Erroneous Node Percentage in Real Data for label outcome
5.4 Evaluation
The tests show that even with very diﬀerent data sizes and very diﬀerent
distributions among the datasets our PIA algorithm can re-identify labels
for each node with very low error rates. These tests prove our initial belief,
that anonymizing the graph by generalizing labels or suppressing edges is
not enough to secure personal privacy. We have tested on a big graph with
relatively small connectivity and on a small graph with relatively high con-
nectivity. In either case PIA was able to put the graph together with less
than 10% error when the graphs were about 80% suppressed.
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On a SN an active adversary could gather more information than what
we assumed at Section 2.3 and could lower the error rate, but even with only
having the information on label distribution an adversary can gain the entire
network.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
Social networks are one of the most popular communication tools of our
time. In our daily activities, checking our social network activity and sharing
thoughts on this platform has become a regular task. However the personal
information shared on SNs are not secure. The privacy settings allow account
holders to decide what to share and where to share and with whom you want
to share. Yet nobody can control what is shared publicly by their friends
on the SN. People might be sharing sensitive information about any account
holder without considering risks or the account holder can share without
realizing the consequences it creates.
Ongoing research on privacy has yielded some anonymization techniques.
These methods can handle many cases, where they anonymize individual
information, suppress edges, and reorganize nodes and/or edges such that
all nodes become similar. Yet the knowledge of adversaries expands, too.
Especially SNs, opposite to tabular datasets, have an inferring mechanism,
caused by the connections between users. Hence anonymization and sup-
pression becomes even harder. In addition to these facts, one must be able
to make sense of the data after it has been anonymized, meaning that the
utility must be kept over a threshold such that publishing the data will be
useful.
In this thesis we propose an attack algorithm, called the probabilistic
inference attack, that exploits this fact of over-sharing [23] or friend-sharing.
The adversary would only need the distribution of the label, that he/she is
57
trying to gain control of. The algorithm iterates over the graph of the SN or
its subparts and calculates the probability of each suppressed node of having
the label or not.
Our tests show that our proposed algorithm is able to re-identify sup-
pressed nodes with very low error rates. In most cases the algorithm was
able to infer the correct labels for more than 90% of the nodes even when
the suppression rate was as high as 80%. Our test consisted of big and small
datasets with low and rich connectivity with respect to each other.
One part we have not yet concluded is, that as the number of labels
increase, how we should modify the algorithm to run each one. In other
words we must test all possible variations of coding the algorithm in order
to find the version with the highest utility. We must also add that our test
data had only suppressed labels on nodes. We tested our algorithm against
low level of connectivity, but did not test on removed or suppressed edges.
Hence in the near future we will be concentrating on solving these issues.
First of all, we will create a crawler to gather information from various SNs
in order to broaden or testing space. Secondly, we will improve our algo-
rithm to infer on multi-label SN datasets with high utility, i.e. based on
memory, speed, error/accuracy. Finally, we will test the revised algorithm
with the new datasets, which we will suppress and anonymize using diﬀerent
techniques. Despite testing against other anonymization methods, we be-
lieve our algorithm will succeed if the anonymized dataset’s utility matches
a standard value for publishing.
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APPENDIX - Actual results of the average er-
roneous node count and node percentage tests
Table 15: Number of errors and the error rate in synthetic data size 25000
A Number of avg. errors Average of errors w.r.t. data size
0.05 16.6¯ 0.067%
0.125 50.5 0.202%
0.250 111.8 0.447%
0.375 201.5 0.806%
0.500 330.3 1.321%
0.625 572 2.28%
0.750 1293.16 5.17%
0.875 3882.8 15.53%
Table 16: Number of errors and the error rate in real data size 783
A Number of avg. errors Average of errors w.r.t.
0.05 4.15 0.53%
0.125 11.2 1.43%
0.250 19.3 2.47%
0.375 29.5 3.76%
0.500 43.5 5.55%
0.625 54 6.9%
0.750 68 8.68%
0.875 81.33 10.38%
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